Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE study of secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper began with Wyner [9] . Following Wyner, Csiszár & Körner [3] dealt with this topic. In this study, we consider a sender Alice and two receivers, an authorized receiver Bob and an unauthorized receiver Eve, who is referred to as a wire-tapper. In this research, we consider two channels, a channel to Bob and a channel to Eve; such a model is called a wire-tap channel. Whereas the studies above treated the discrete memoryless case, Hayashi [8] derived a general capacity formula for an arbitrary sequence of wire-tap channels.
In the discrete memoryless case, when the transmission rate is less than the capacity, Eve's information goes to zero exponentially. Hayashi [8] also estimates this exponential decreasing rate. Although this type of evaluation seems unimportant, it is useful for estimating Eve's information from a finite-length code. The first purpose of this paper is to improve the previous exponentially decreasing rate for Eve's information.
On the other hand, using the Rényi entropy of order 2, Bennett et al [7] evaluate Eve's information after the application of a universal 2 hashing function [4] . Their result can be regarded in terms of the generation of a secret key from a common random number without communication. Renato [13] improved this approach and obtained an evaluation based on smooth Rényi entropy. He applied his method to the security analysis of quantum key distribution. However, the relation between the Rényi entropy approach and the wire-tap approach is not clear.
In this paper, we extend the result of Bennett et al [7] to the case of the Rényi entropy of order 1 + s for s ∈ [0, 1]. We obtain a new upper bound for Eve's information in M. Hayashi is with Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, Aoba-ku, Sendai, 980-8579, Japan (e-mail: hayashi@math.is.tohoku.ac.jp) secret key generation from a common random number without communication. Applying this evaluation, we derive another upper bound for Eve's information from random coding in a wire-tap channel. This upper bound for Eve's information is better than Hayashi [8] 's bound for the wire-tap channel model when the channel to Eve is additive or the sacrifice information rate is close to mutual information with Eve. Moreover, the upper bound obtained here satisfies the concavity property with respect to the distribution of Alice's system. This property is essential for connecting this proof with secret key generation from a common random number without communication. The method we present contrasts with the method in Hayashi [8] .
Hayashi [8] deals with channel resolvability and applies it to the security of wire-tap channel; This approach was strongly motivated by Devetak [10] and Winter et al [11] .
In a realistic setting, it is usual to restrict attention to linear codes. We also discuss our code generated by a combination of arbitrary linear codes and privacy amplification by a Toeplitz matrix [6] . Even in this restricted case, we obtain the same upper bound for Eve's information. When the channel is an additive channel or a variant of an additive channel, this combination attains the transmission rate obtained by Csiszár & Körner [3] .
Further, Ahlswede & Csiszár [2] , Maurer [1] , Bennett et al [7] Muramatsu [14] et al treated secret key agreement by public discussion. We also apply our result to this problem. Then we obtain an upper bound of Eve's information. In this case, we apply our code to a wire-tap channel with a variant of additive channels. Our protocol can be realized by a combination of a linear code and privacy amplification by a Toeplitz matrix [6] . As was pointed out in [1] , this method can attain the famous key generation rate H(A|E)−H(A|B) where A, B, E are the random variables for Alice, Bob, and Eve respectively. Further, we obtain a better exponential bound for Eve's information in the independent and identical case than Bennett et al [7] .
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we extend the result of Bennett et al [7] to the case of the Rényi entropy of order 1 + s for s ∈ [0, 1]. That is, we treat secret key generation from a common random number without communication. In Section III, using this evaluation, we derive another upper bound for Eve's information from random coding in a wire-tap channel. In Section IV, the obtained upper bound for Eve's information is compared with Hayashi [8] 's upper bound in the wire-tap channel model. In Section V, we consider the combination of an arbitrary linear code and privacy amplification by a Toeplitz matrix. In Section VI, the result is applied to secret key agreement by public discussion. Section VII is devoted to the proof of our bound for secret key generation from a common random number without communication.
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITHOUT COMMUNICATION
Firstly, we consider the secure key generation problem from a common random number a ∈ A which has been partially eavesdropped on by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that Alice and Bob share a common random number a ∈ A, and Eve has another random number e ∈ E, which is correlated to the random number a. The task is to extract a common random number f (a) from the random number a ∈ A, which is almost independent of Eve's random number e ∈ E. Here, Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function f to the common random number a ∈ A. In order to discuss this problem, for s ∈ [0, 1], we define the Rényi entropy of order 1 + s:
and the conditional Rényi entropy of order s:
Using this function, we obtain the following theorem Theorem 1: There exists a function f from A to {1, . . . , M } such that
(1) Note that Bennett et al [7] proved this inequality for the case of s = 1. In order to prove this theorem, we focus on an ensemble of the functions f X from A to {1, . . . , M }, where X denotes a random variable describing the stochastic behavior of the function f . An ensemble of the functions f X is called universal 2 when it satisfies the following condition [4] :
Condition 1: ∀a 1 = ∀a 2 ∈ A, the probability that
Indeed, when the cardinality |A| is a power of a prime q and M is another power of the same prime q, the ensemble {f X } is given by the Toeplitz matrix (X, I) [6] with log q |A| − 1 random variables taking values in F q .
As is shown in the Appendix, when the ensemble of the functions {f X } is universal 2 , it satisfies
The proof will be given in Section VII. Since
we obtain
This implies the existence of the function f satisfying (1).
Next, we consider the case when our distribution P AnEn is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution of P AE . Define the optimal generation rate:
Then, we can show
Thus, when the generation rate lim 1 n log M n is R, the exponentially decreasing rate of I(f n (A n ) : E n ) is greater than max 0≤s≤1 −sR − H 1+s (A|E|P A,E ). Taking the limit as s → +0, we have
This implies that the rate R is less than H(A|E), the value max 0≤s≤1 −sR − H 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) is strictly positive. Hence, G(P AE ) ≥ H(A|E). The converse inequality can be shown as follows. In this problem, our protocol is a deterministic transformation, i.e., it can be described by a pair (f n , M n ) satisfying I(f n (A n ) :
III. THE WIRE-TAP CHANNEL IN A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Next, we consider the wire-tap channel model, in which the eavesdropper (wire-tapper), Eve and the authorized receiver Bob receive information from the authorized sender Alice. In this case, in order for Eve to have less information, Alice chooses a suitable encoding. This problem is formulated as follows. Let Y and Z be the probability spaces of Bob and Eve, and X be the set of alphabets sent by Alice. Then, the main channel from Alice to Bob is described by W B :
, and the wire-tapper channel from Alice to Eve is described by W E : x → W E x . In this setting, Alice chooses M distributions Q 1 , . . . , Q M on X , and she generates x ∈ X subject to Q i when she wants to send the message i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. Bob prepares M disjoint subsets D 1 , . . . , D M of Y and judges that a message is i if y belongs to D i . Therefore, the triplet (M, {Q 1 , . . . , Q M }, {D 1 , . . . , D M }) is called a code, and is described by Φ. Its performance is given by the following three quantities. The first is the size M , which is denoted by |Φ|. The second is the average error probability ǫ B (Φ):
and the third is Eve's information regarding the transmitted message I E (Φ):
In order to calculate these values, we introduce the following quantities.
where
The following lemma gives the properties of these quantities. 
. Therefore, we obtain the concavity of e ψ(s|W,p) . Using these quantities, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 2: There exists a code Φ for any integers L, M , and any probability distribution p on X such that
Hayashi [8] proved a similar result when the right hand side of (5) is replaced by 2 min 0≤s≤1/2
Proof:
In order to choose a code Φ satisfying the above conditions, we choose our code by Gallager [12] 's random coding method. Then, the generated random code Φ(Y) with size LM can be described by the LM independent and identical random variables Y subject to the distribution p on X . For integers l = 1, . . . , L and m = 1, . . . , M , let D ′ l,m (Y) be the maximum likelihood decoder of the code Φ(Y). Gallager [12] showed that the ensemble expectation of the average error probability is less than (M L) X {i}, we obtain a code Φ(X, Y) of size M for the wire-tap channel W B , W E . Then, Eve's information is evaluated by
where p mix,Φ(Y) is the uniform distribution on the code Φ(Y).
The concavity of e ψ(s|W E ,p) (Lemma 1) guarantees that
Hence, using the Markov inequality, we obtain
Therefore, there exists a code Φ satisfying the desired conditions.
In the n-fold discrete memoryless channels W Bn and W En of the channels W B and W E , the additive equation φ(s|W Bn , p) = nφ(s|W B , p) holds. Thus, there exists a code Φ n for any integers L n , M n , and any probability distribution p on X such that
Since lim s→0 . For this purpose, we take their Taylor expansions as follows.
Indeed, applying the Schwarz inequality to the inner product f, g := x p x W x (y)f (y)g(y), we obtain can be better evaluated as follows. When X = Z and X is a module and 
we obtain e ψ (R|W
1+s . Fig. 1 shows the comparison of e ψ (R|W E , p mix ) and e φ (R|W E , p mix ) with e ψ,2 (R|W E , p mix ) := (R − log |X |) − H 2 (X|P ), which is directly obtained from Bennett et al [7] .
Next, we consider a more general case. Eve is assumed to have two random variables z ∈ X and z ′ . The first random variable z is the output of an additive channel depending on the second variable z ′ . That is, the channel W [7] ). p = 0.2, log 2 − h(p) = 0.192745.
V. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL WITH LINEAR CODING
In a practical sense, we need to take into account the decoding time. For this purpose, we often restrict our codes to linear codes. In the following, we consider the case where the sender's space X has the structure of a module. First, we regard a submodule C 1 ⊂ X as an encoding for the usual sent message, and focus on its decoding {D x } x∈C1 by the authorized receiver. We construct a code for a wire-tap channel
is given as the uniform distribution on the coset [x] := x + C 2 , and the decoding D [x] is given as the subset ∪ x ′ ∈x+C2 D x ′ . Next, we assume that a submodule C 2 (X) of C 1 with cardinality |C 2 (X)| = L is generated by a random variable X satisfying the following condition.
Condition 2: Any element x = 0 ∈ C 1 is included in C 2 (X) with probability at most L |C1| . Then, the performance of the constructed code is evaluated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Choose the subcode C 2 (X) according to Condition 2. We construct the code Φ C1,C2(X) by choosing the distribution Q [x] to be the uniform distribution on [x] for [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 (X). Then, we obtain
where P mix,S is the uniform distribution on the subset S.
Proof: This inequality can be shown by (3) as follows. Now, we define the joint distribution P (x, z) := P mix,C1 (x)W E x (z). The choice of Q [x] corresponds to a hashing operation satisfying Condition 1. Then, (3) yields that E X I E (Φ C1,C2(X) ) is bounded by
, which implies (10). When the channel W E is additive, i.e., W E x (z) = P (z − x), the equation ψ(s|W E , P mix,C1+x ) = ψ(s|W E , P mix,C1 ) holds for any x. Thus, the concavity of e ψ(s|W
Thus, we obtain
Similarly, when the channel W E is general additive, i.e., W
When X is an n-dimensional vector space F n q over the finite field F q , the subcode C 2 (X) of the random linear privacy amplification can be constructed in an economical way. That is, when C 1 is equivalent to F m q , an ensemble of the subcodes C 2 (X) satisfying Condition 2 can be generated from only the m − 1 independent random variables X 1 , . . . , X m−1 on the finite field F q as follows. When |C 2 (X)| = q k , we choose the subcode C 2 (X) as the kernel of the m × (m − k) matrix (X, I), where I is the (m − k) × (m − k) identity matrix and the k × (m − k) matrix X = (X i,j ) is defined by the m − 1 random variables X 1 , . . . , X m−1 as follows.
This matrix is called a Toeplitz matrix. Note that the matrix (X, I) always has rank k. Further, as is shown in the Appendix, the ensemble of the encodings
Further, the encoding {Q T |b ∈ F k q } is equal to C 2 (X). This can be checked using the fact that (X, I)(b, x − Xb) T = x and the set {(b, −Xb)
Therefore, if the error correcting code C 1 can be constructed with effective encoding and decoding times and W E is additive or general additive, the code Φ C1,C2(X) for a wiretap channel satisfying the inequality (12) or (13) can be constructed by using random linear privacy amplification.
Furthermore, for the n-fold discrete memoryless case of the wire-tap channel W B , W E , it is possible to achieve the rate I(P mix,X : W B ) − I(P mix,X : W E ) by a combination of this error correcting and random linear privacy amplification when an error correcting code attaining the Shannon rate I(P mix,X : W B ) is available and the channel W E is general additive, i.e., W
In this case, when the sacrifice information rate is R, as follows from the discussion of Section IV and (11), the exponentially decreasing rate of Eve's information is greater than max 0≤s≤1 s(R − log |X |) −
This method is very useful when the channels W B and W E are additive. However, even if the channels are not additive or general additive, this method is still useful because it is more economical than the random coding method given in the proof of Theorem 2.
VI. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
Next, following Maurer [1] , we apply the above discussions to secret key agreement, in which, Alice, Bob, and Eve are assumed to have initial random variables a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and e ∈ E, respectively. The task for Alice and Bob is to share a common random variable almost independent of Eve's random variable e by using a public communication. The quality is evaluated by three quantities: the size of the final common random variable, the probability that their final variables coincide, and the mutual information between Alice's final variables and Eve's random variable. In order to construct a protocol for this task, we assume that the set A has a module structure (any finite set can be regarded as a cyclic group). Then, the objective of secret key agreement can be realized by applying the code of a wire-tap channel as follows. First, Alice generates another uniform random variable x and sends the random variable x ′ := x − a. Then, the distribution of the random variables b, x ′ (e, x ′ ) accessible to Bob (Eve) can be regarded as the output distribution of the channel
The channels W B and W E are given as follows.
where P AB (a, b) (P AE (a, e)) is the joint probability between Alice's initial random variable a and Bob's (Eve's) initial random variable b (e). Hence, the channel W E is general additive.
Applying Theorem 2 to the uniform distribution P A mix , for any numbers M and L, there exists a code Φ such that
where φ(s|P
s . This is because φ(s|W B , P mix,A ) = φ(s|P AB ) and ψ(s|W E , P mix,A ) = H 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) + s log |A|.
In particular, when X is an n-dimensional vector space F n q over the finite field F q and the joint distribution between A and B(E) is the n-fold independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) of P A,B (P A,E ), respectively, the relations φ(s|P A n ,B n ) = nφ(s|P A,B ) and H 1+s (A n |E n |(P A,E ) n ) = nH 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) hold. Thus, there exists a code Φ n for any integers L n , M n , and any probability distribution p on X such that − (H(P E ) + H(P A ) − H(P A,E )) =I(A : B) − I(A : E) = H(A|E) − H(A|B), which was obtained by Maurer [1] and Ahlswede-Csiszár [2] . Here, since the channels W B and W E can be regarded as general additive, we can apply the discussion in Section V. That is, the bound (16) can be attained in the economical way discussed in Section V.
VII. PROOF OF INEQUALITY (2)
The concavity of x → x s implies that
H1+s(X|P •f
P (x ′ )) s .
Condition 1 guarantees that
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x + y) s ≤ x s + y s for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, 
